This paper examines optimal monetary policy in an open-economy two-country model with sticky prices. We show that currency misalignments are inefficient and lower world welfare. We find that optimal policy must target not only inflation and the output gap, but also the currency misalignment. However the interest rate reaction function that supports this targeting rule may involve only the CPI inflation rate. This result illustrates how examination of "instrument rules" may hide important trade-offs facing policymakers that are incorporated in "targeting rules". The model is a modified version of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler's (JME, 2002). The key change is that we allow pricing to market or local-currency pricing and consider the policy implications of currency misalignments. Besides highlighting the importance of the currency misalignment, our model also gives a rationale for targeting CPI, rather than PPI, inflation.
Exchange rates among the large economies have fluctuated dramatically over the past 30 years. The dollar/euro exchange rate has experienced swings of greater than 60%, and even the Canadian dollar/U.S. dollar has risen and fallen by more than 35% in the past decade, but inflation rates in these countries have differed by only a percentage point or two per year. Should these exchange rate movements be a concern for policymakers? Would it not be better for policymakers to focus on output and inflation and let a freely floating exchange rate settle at a market determined level?
It is widely understood that purchasing power parity does not hold in the short run.
Empirical evidence points to the possibility of "local-currency pricing" (LCP) or "pricing to market". 1 That is, exporting firms may price discriminate among markets, and/or set prices in the buyers' currencies. A currency could be overvalued if the consumer price level is higher at home than abroad when compared in a common currency, or undervalued if the relative price level is lower at home. Currency misalignments can be very large even in advanced economies.
There is frequent public discussion of the importance of controlling currency misalignments. For example, on November 3, 2008, Robert Rubin (former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury) and Jared Bernstein (of the Economic Policy Institute) co-authored an op-ed piece in the New York Times that argued, "Public policy…has been seriously deficient [because of] false choices, grounded in ideology" (Rubin and Bernstein, 2008.) One of the principles they argue that all should agree upon is "we need to work with other countries toward equilibrium exchange rates." Yet there is little support in the modern New Keynesian literature on monetary policy for the notion that central banks should target exchange rates. Specifically, if policymakers are already optimally responding to inflation and the output gap, is there any reason to pay attention to exchange-rate misalignments?
Our answer is yes. In a simple, familiar framework, this paper draws out the implications for monetary policy when currency misalignments are possible. Currency misalignments lead to inefficient allocations for reasons that are analogous to the problems with inflation in a world of staggered price setting. When there are currency misalignments, households in the Home and Foreign countries may pay different prices for the identical good. A basic tenet of economics is that violations of the law of one price are inefficient -if the good's marginal cost is the same irrespective of where the good is sold, it is not efficient to sell the good at different prices. We 1 Many studies have found evidence of violations of the law of one price for consumer prices. Two prominent studies are Engel (1999) and Atkeson and Burstein (2008) . The literature is voluminous -these two papers contain many relevant citations.
find that currency misalignments lead to a reduction in world welfare and that optimal monetary policy trades off this currency misalignment with inflation and output goals.
These currency misalignments arise even when foreign exchange markets are efficient.
That is, the currency misalignment distortion that concerns policymakers arises in the goods market -from price setting -and not in the foreign exchange market. The model of this paper determines the foreign exchange rate in an efficient currency market as a function of fundamental economic variables. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) , Gali and Monacelli (2005) , and others have emphasized the important role of exchange rate adjustment in a model that assumes firms set prices in their own currency (PCP, for "producer-currency pricing".) In the PCP framework, a change in the nominal exchange rate automatically translates into a change in the price of imported goods. The exchange rate immediately changes the relative price of imported to local goods, and so plays an important role in achieving nearly efficient outcomes. Why, then, is it optimal to target currency misalignments when there is pricing to market? In this setting, the exchange rate does not play role of automatically adjusting relative prices facing households. The effect is much weaker because imported goods prices are set by the producer and do not respond automatically to exchange rate changes. On the other hand, if prices are sticky in the importer's currency, the change in the exchange rate can lead to inefficient movements in the price of the same good sold in different countries. Hence there is a need to target currency misalignments.
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To understand the contribution of this paper, it is helpful to place it relative to three sets of papers:
1. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) develop what is probably the canonical model for openeconomy monetary policy analysis in the New Keynesian framework. Their two-country model assumes PCP, and that Home and Foreign households have identical preferences. These two assumptions lead to the conclusion that purchasing power parity holds at all times -the consumption real exchange rate is constant.
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This paper introduces local-currency pricing into CGG's model. We derive simple rules for monetary policy that are similar to CGG's. While the model is not rich relative to sophisticated models in the literature (models that introduce capital, working capital, capacity utilization, habits in preferences, etc.), the simple model is helpful for developing intuition because the model can be solved analytically, an explicit second-order approximation to the policymaker's loss function can be derived, explicit "target criteria" for policy can be derived, and explicit interest rate reaction functions can be derived.
The paper also allows Home and Foreign households to have different preferences. They can exhibit a home bias in preferences -a larger weight on goods produced in a household's country of residence. 4 This generalization does not change the optimal target criteria at all in the CGG framework, but as we now explain, is helpful in developing a realistic LCP model.
2. Devereux and Engel (2003) explicitly examine optimal monetary policy in a two-country framework with LCP. Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) extend the analysis in several directions.
However, neither of these studies is suited toward answering the question posed above: is currency misalignment a separate concern of monetary policy, or will the optimal exchange-rate behavior be achieved through a policy that considers inflation and the output gap?
These models have a couple of crucial assumptions that make them unsuited to answering this question. First, like CGG, they assume identical preferences in both countries. This assumption leads to the outcome that currency misalignments are the only source of CPI inflation differences between the two countries in the LCP framework. Eliminating inflation differences eliminates currency misalignments and vice-versa. 5 Second, price stickiness is the only distortion in the economy in these papers. In contrast,
CGG introduce "cost-push shocks", so that policymakers face a tradeoff between the goals of zero inflation and zero output gap. In Devereux and Engel (2003) , the optimal monetary policy under LCP sets inflation to zero in each country, thus eliminating any currency misalignment.
By introducing home bias in preferences, the tight link between relative inflation rates and currency misalignments is broken. A more realistic model for inflation results -one in which relative CPI inflation rates depend not only on currency misalignments, but also on the internal relative price of imported to domestically-produced goods. Moreover, we follow CGG in allowing for cost-push shocks. There is home bias in the sense that while the country is small, the limit of the ratio of expenditure share on home goods to population share is not equal to one. Faia and Monacelli (2008) examine optimal monetary policy in a small open economy model with home bias, using a Ramsey style analysis. Pappa (2004) considers a twocountry model with home bias. However, the second-order approximation to the welfare function is expressed in terms of deviations of consumption from its efficient level, rather than in terms of the output gap, so the analysis is not strictly comparable to ours. See Woodford (2003) for a discussion of why we approximate in terms of the output gap rather than consumption. 5 See Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) , who emphasize this point. 6 The contribution of Sutherland (2005) merits attention. His two-country model allows for imperfect passthrough, and for differences in Home and Foreign preferences. His model is static, and he derives a welfare function in which the variance of the exchange rate appears. However, the other terms in the welfare function are prices, so it is not clear how this function relates to standard quadratic approximations that This paper also derives optimal policy in a framework that is consonant with the bulk of New Keynesian models of monetary policy analysis. Devereux and Engel (2003) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) assume price setting is synchronized, with prices set one period in advance.
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Here we adopt the standard Calvo price-setting technology, which allows for asynchronized price setting. This change is important, because it emphasizes the point that the cost of inflation under sticky is misaligned relative prices. Also, the previous papers assumed that the money supply was the instrument of monetary policy. This paper follows CGG and most of the modern literature in assuming that the policymakers directly control the nominal interest rate in each country. 3.
There are many papers that numerically solve rich open economy models, and examine optimal policy. Some of these papers allow for local currency pricing. Many of those papers are in the framework of a small open economy, and so do not specifically account for the global misallocation of resources that occurs with currency misalignments. 9 Moreover, many use ad hoc welfare criteria for the policymaker or approximations that are not strictly derived from household welfare. 10 One of the main contributions of this paper is to derive the role of the currency misalignment in the policymaker's loss function.
Some papers have considered whether it is beneficial to augment the interest rate reaction function of central banks with an exchange-rate variable. 11 They ask the question: if the Taylor rule has the interest rate reacting to inflation and the output gap, is there any gain from adding the exchange rate? Typically these studies find little or no evidence of welfare gains from adding the exchange rate to the Taylor rule.
involve output gaps and inflation levels. Moreover, Sutherland does not derive optimal monetary policy in his framework. 7 A sophisticated extension of this work is the recent paper by Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2007) . That paper extends earlier work in several dimensions, including staggered price setting. But it does not directly address the issue of whether currency misalignments belong in the targeting rule along with output gaps and inflation. 8 While the model of this paper adheres strictly to the set-up of CGG, changing only the assumptions of identical preferences and LCP instead of PCP price setting, the model is very similar to that of Benigno's (2004) . Woodford (2007) also considers the LCP version of CGG (though not for optimal monetary policy analysis) and makes the connection to Benigno's paper. Monacelli (2005) considers a small-open economy model with local-currency pricing, and examines optimal monetary policy using an ad hoc welfare criterion. 9 See, for example, Kollmann (2002) , Smets and Wouters (2002) , Ambler, Dib, and Rebei (2004) , and Adolfson, et. al. (2008) . See also Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) who examine a small-open economy model with non-traded goods (but with PCP for export pricing.) 10 For example, Smets and Wouters (2002) , Ambler, Dib, and Rebei (2004) , and Adolfson, et. al. (2008) . 11 In a small open economy, see Kollmann (2002) and Leitemo and Soderstrom (2005) . In a two-country model, see Wang (2009 The key point to be made here is that CGG's model shows that optimal policy must trade off the inflation and output goals of the central bank. But the optimal interest rate reaction function does not necessarily include the output gap. That is, adding the output gap to the interest rate rule that already includes inflation will not improve welfare. Focusing on the "instrument rule" does not reveal the role of the output gap that is apparent in the "targeting rule" in the terminology of Svensson (1999 Svensson ( , 2002 ).
An analogous situation arises in the LCP model concerning currency misalignments. We can characterize the "target criteria" in this model with two rules, as in the CGG model. The first is . This rule, at first glance, appears to be simply the sum of the two "target criteria" in the CGG model. It is, except that the inflation rates that appear in this tradeoff We proceed in two steps. After setting out the objectives of households and firms, the production functions, and the market structure, we derive a global loss function for cooperative monetary policymakers. We can derive the period loss function without making any assumptions about how goods prices or set or how wages are set. 15 We find that in addition to squares and cross-products of Home and Foreign output gaps, and the cross-sectional dispersion of goods prices within each country, the loss also depends on the squared currency misalignment. This loss function evaluates the welfare costs arising because firms set different prices in the Home and Foreign country (assuming the costs of selling the good in both countries are identical), and does not depend on whether the price differences arise from local-currency price stickiness, from price discrimination, or for some other reason.
We then follow CGG and assume a Calvo mechanism for price setting. However, we allow for possibility of local-currency pricing. As in CGG, we derive optimal policy under discretion. We obtain both targeting rules and instrument rules. We consider only optimal 14 Coenen, Lombardo, Smets, and Straub (2007) examine optimal monetary policy in a two-country model that exhibits incomplete pass-through. However, the numerical analysis does not allow the reader to see explicitly the role of currency misalignments. 15 Except that we do assume that all households (which are identical) set the same wage. As we note later, this rules out a model of staggered wage setting such as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) , though a generalization to encompass that case would be straightforward.
cooperative policy. Our goal is to quantify the global loss from currency misalignments, which we can see by deriving the loss function for a policymaker that aims to maximize the sum of utilities of Home and Foreign households. Practically speaking, international agreements that prohibit currency manipulation may mean that the currency misalignment can only be addressed in a cooperative environment. 16 That is, it seems likely that if central banks are going to move toward policies that explicitly target exchange rates, they will do so cooperatively.
The Model
The model we examine is nearly identical to CGG's. We consider two countries of equal size, while CGG allow the population of the countries to be different. The model assumes two countries, each inhabited with a continuum of households, normalized to a total of one in each country. Households have utility over consumption of goods and disutility from provision of labor services. In each country, there is a continuum of goods produced, each by a monopolist. Households supply labor to firms located within their own country, and get utility from all goods produced in both countries. Each household is a monopolistic supplier of a unique type of labor to firms within its country. We assume that there is trade in a complete set of nominally-denominated contingent claims Monopolistic firms produce output using only labor, subject to technology shocks.
At this stage, we will not make any assumptions on how wages are set by monopolistic households or prices are set by monopolistic firms. In particular, prices and wages may be sticky, and there may be LCP or PCP for firms. We derive the period loss function for the policymaker, which expresses the loss (relative to the efficient outcome) in terms of within-country and
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For example, the IMF Articles of Agreement state that member countries shall "avoid manipulating exchange rates ... to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members." See Staiger and Sykes (2008) . international price misalignments and output gaps. This loss function applies under various assumptions about how prices are actually set, and so is more general than the policy rules we subsequently derive which depend on the specifics of price and wage setting.
All households within a country are identical. We will assume that in each period, their labor supplies are identical. This assumption rules out staggered wage setting as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) , because in that model there will be dispersion in labor input across households that arises from the dispersion in wages set. Our set-up is consistent with sticky wages, but not wage dispersion. However, it is entirely straightforward to generalize the loss functions we derive to allow for wage dispersion following the steps in Erceg, Levin, and Henderson. We do not do that because we want our model to be directly comparable to CGG.
1.a. Households
The representative household in the home country maximizes
C h is the consumption aggregate. We assume Cobb-Douglas preferences: In turn, and are CES aggregates over a continuum of goods produced in each country:
N h is an aggregate of the labor services that the household sells to each of a continuum of firms located in the home country:
Households receive wage income, , aggregate profits from home firms, ( ) ( ) 
is the price of a claim that pays one dollar in state
In this equation, is the exact price index for consumption, given by:
, .
Ht P is the Home-currency price of the Home aggregate good and Ft P is the Home currency price of the Foreign aggregate good. Equation (6) follows from cost minimization. Also, from cost minimization, and Ht P Ft P are the usual CES aggregates over prices of individual varieties, f:
, and
Foreign households have analogous preferences and face an analogous budget constraint.
Because all Home households are identical, we can drop the index for the household and use the fact that aggregate per capita consumption of each good is equal to the consumption of each good by each household. The first-order conditions for consumption are given by:
( )
In equation (11), we explicitly use an index for the state at time t for the purpose of clarity.
is the normalized price of the state contingent claim. That is, it is defined as divided by the probability of state
Note that the sum of across all possible states at time t + 1 must equal 1/
where t R denotes the gross nominal yield on a one-period non-state-contingent bond. Therefore, taking a probability-weighted sum across all states of equation (11), we have the familiar Euler equation:
Analogous equations hold for Foreign households. Since contingent claims are (arbitrarily) denominated in Home currency, the first-order condition for Foreign households that is analogous to equation (11) is:
Here, t E refers to the home currency price of foreign currency exchange rate.
17
As noted above, we will assume at this stage that labor input of all households is the same, so ( )
1.b. Firms
Each Home good, is made according to a production function that is linear in the labor input. These are given by:
Note that the productivity shock,
, is common to all firms in the Home country.
CES composite of individual home-country household labor, given by:
where the technology parameter, t η , is stochastic and common to all Home firms.
Profits are given by:
In this equation, is the home-currency price of the good when it is sold in the Home country. is the foreign-currency price of the good when it is sold in the Foreign country.
is aggregate sales of the good in the home country:
We offer an apology to the reader here. We want to stick to CGG's notation, who use for the log of the nominal exchange rate. Consistency requires us to use to refer to the level of the nominal exchange rate, so we have used the distinct but similar notation 
We have used and to represent the price of imported to locally-produced goods in the Home and Foreign countries, respectively:
Equations (11) and (13) give us the familiar condition that arises in open-economy models with a complete set of state-contingent claims when PPP does not hold:
Total employment is determined by output in each industry:
Log-linearized Model
In this section, we present some log-linear approximations to the models presented above.
The full set of log-linearized equations appears in Appendix A. Our approach to the optimal policy decision is to consider a second-order approximation of the welfare function around the efficient steady state. The derivation of the loss function itself requires a second-order approximation of the utility function itself, but in the course of the derivation will actually require second-order approximations to some of the equations of the model. However, for many purposes, the first-order approximations are useful: the constraints in the optimization problem need only be approximated to the first order; the optimality conditions for monetary policy -the We define the log of the deviation from the law of one price as: 
The model is closed and solutions for the endogenous variables can be derived once policy rules are determined. We turn to consideration of optimal monetary policy.
Loss Functions and Optimal Policy
We derive the loss function for the cooperative monetary policy problem. The loss function is derived from a second-order approximation to households' utility functions. Loss is measured relative to the efficient allocations.
The policymaker wishes to minimize (32) .
This loss function is derived from household's utility, given in Equation (1). The period loss, , represents the difference between the maximum utility achievable under efficient allocations and the utility of the market-determined levels of consumption and leisure. 
The period loss depends on the squared output gap in each country, as well as the squared difference in the output gaps. 
It is important to recognize that the loss function derived here, as well as the loss function derived previously (equation (33) That would lead to overproduction in the Home country, were it not for relative price adjustments -which is why . 0 < We highlight the fact that the loss functions are derived without specific assumptions about price setting not to give a false patina of generality to the result, but to emphasize that the loss in welfare arises not specifically from price stickiness but from prices that do not deliver the efficient allocations. Of course it is our specific assumptions of nominal price and wage setting that give rise to the internal and external price misalignments in this model, and indeed monetary policy would be ineffective if there were no nominal price or wage stickiness. But one could imagine especially a number of mechanisms that give rise to deviations from the law of one price, because the literature has produced a number of models based both on nominal stickiness and real factors. In the next section, we modify the CGG model in the simplest way -allowing localcurrency pricing instead of producer-currency pricing -to examine further the implications of currency misalignments.
Price and Wage Setting
We now introduce our models of price and wage setting. We follow CGG in assuming wages are set flexibly by monopolistic suppliers of labor, but goods prices are sticky. Wages adjust continuously, but households exploit their monopoly power by setting a wage that incorporates a mark-up over their utility cost of work.
Government is assumed to have only limited fiscal instruments. The government can set a constant output subsidy rate for monopolistic firms, which will achieve an efficient allocation in the non-stochastic steady state. But unfortunately, the mark-up charged by workers is timevarying because the elasticity of demand for their labor services is assumed to follow a stochastic process. These shocks are sometimes labeled "cost-push" shocks, and give rise to the well-known tradeoff in CGG's work between controlling inflation and achieving a zero output gap.
Households are monopolistic suppliers of their unique form of labor services. Household h faces demand for its labor services given by:
The first-order condition for household h's choice of labor supply is given by:
The optimal wage set by the household is a time-varying mark-up over the marginal disutility of work (expressed in consumption units.)
Because all households are identical, we have ( )
Since all households are identical, we have from equation (37): the value for variables if prices were flexible, and optimal subsidies to monopolistic suppliers of labor and monopolistic producers of goods were in place. This includes a time-varying subsidy to suppliers of labor to offset the time-varying mark-up in wages in equation (37).
Flexible Prices
Home firms maximize profits given by equation (16), subject to the demand curve (10).
They optimally set prices as a mark-up over marginal cost:
, where
When optimal subsidies are in place: We assume a standard Calvo pricing technology. A given firm may reset its prices with probability 1 θ − each period. We assume that when the firm resets its price, it will be able to reset its prices for sales in both markets. The PCP firm sets both prices in its own currency -that is, the Home firm sets both and in Home currency. (As will become apparent, the firm optimally chooses the same price for both markets, . 
The solution for the optimal price for the Home firm for sale in the Home country is given by: 
t j t t j H t j H t j t j Ht j t t t j Ht j Ht j j
For sale in the foreign market, we have: 
t j t t j t j Ht j Ht j t j j Ht j t t t j t j Ht j Ht j j
Under the Calvo price setting mechanism, a fraction θ of prices remain unchanged from the previous period. From equation (7), we can write:
1/(1 ) 1 0 1 1 ( ) (1 )( ) 
Equations (50) and (51) hold in the LCP case as well. However, the law of one price does not hold.
Subsidies
As in CGG, we will assume that subsidies to monopolists are not set at their optimal level except in steady-state. That is, instead of the efficient subsidy given in equation (41) Similarly for foreign producer-price inflation, we have:
In the LCP model, the law of one price deviation is not zero. We have:
There are also price adjustment equations for the local prices of imported goods:
From (57)- (58) and (59)- (60) s s = − as we noted above. That is, the relative price of Foreign to Home goods is the same in both countries. We emphasize that this is true in general for a first-order approximation.
The policymaker has home and foreign nominal interest rates as instruments. As is standard in the literature, we can model the policymaker as directly choosing output gaps, inflation levels, and (in the LCP case) deviations from the law of one price, subject to constraints.
From the first-order conditions, we can back out the optimal choice of nominal interest rates using a log-linearized version of equation (12) and its foreign counterpart, given by:
t t t t r E c c
π σ The criteria given in (68) are identical to those that arise in the closed-economy version of this model. There is a tradeoff between the goals of eliminating the output gap and driving inflation to zero, and the elasticity of substitution among goods produced in the country determines the weights given to output gaps and inflation.
It is worth emphasizing that equation (68) 
The loss function is similar to the one under PCP. The main point to highlight is that squared deviations from the law of one price matter for welfare, as well as output gaps and inflation rates.
Deviations from the law of one price are distortionary and are a separate source of loss in the LCP model.
The policymaker under discretion seeks to minimize the loss subject to the constraints of the Phillips curves, (57)- (58) and (59)- (60). There is an additional constraint in the LCP model. 
Using (70) in conjunction with (57) and (60) 
This constraint arises in the LCP model but not in the PCP model precisely because import prices are sticky and subject to a Calvo price-adjustment mechanism, rather than free to respond via nominal exchange-rate changes.
Another contrast with the PCP model is that there are four sticky prices in the LCP model, so non-zero inflation rates for each of the four matter for welfare. Indeed, we note that we can rewrite the loss function as: The LCP optimization problem under discretion becomes very messy and difficult because of the additional constraint given by equation (71), because there now are endogenous state variables. The choices of Home output gap relative to the Foreign output gap and the deviation from the law of one price puts constraints on the evolution of future output gaps, inflation rates and deviations from the law of one price. In the LCP case, the dynamic game between current and future policymakers is non-trivial.
But inspection of equation (71) this special case is that the parameter φ does not appear in either the target criteria or the optimal interest rate rule in the CGG model, so we can compare the criteria and rules directly to the LCP model. We also note that Devereux and Engel (2003) make the same assumption on preferences.
Using (72), in this case the loss function can be simplified to: 
where the R superscript represents Home relative to Foreign. That is, 
The first condition seems quite similar to the first condition in the PCP case, (66):
The condition calls for a tradeoff between the world output gap and the world inflation rate, just as in the PCP case. But there is a key difference -here in the LCP model, it is the CPI, not the PPI, inflation rates that enter into the policymaker's tradeoff.
The second condition can be written as: (80) 1
Here, is the consumption real exchange rate, defined as: (81) .
q is the deviation of the real exchange rate from its efficient level, and we have used the relationship:
Equation (80) represents the second of the target criteria as a tradeoff between misaligned real exchange rates and relative CPI inflation rates. In the LCP model, where exchange-rate misalignments are possible, we can see from (82) this optimal policy involves trading off relative output gaps, relative CPI inflation rates, and the currency misalignment.
Optimal Policy under PCP vs. LCP
It is helpful to compare the target criteria under PCP and LCP. We will compare conditions (66) and (67) under PCP to conditions (79) and (80) 
This tradeoff is the exact analogy to the closed economy tradeoff between the output gap and inflation, and the intuition of that tradeoff is well understood. On the one hand, with asynchronized price setting, inflation leads to misalignment of relative prices, so any non-zero level of inflation is distortionary. On the other hand, because the monopoly power of labor is time-varying due to the time-varying elasticity of labor demand, output levels can be inefficiently low or high even when inflation is zero. Conditions (66) or (79) describe the terms of that tradeoff. Inflation is more costly when the higher is the elasticity of substitution among varieties of goods, ξ , because a higher elasticity will imply greater resource misallocation when there is inflation.
The difference in optimal policy under PCP versus LCP comes in the comparison of condition (67) Under PCP, the law of one price holds continuously, so there is no currency misalignment. In that case, , and relative Home to Foreign consumption is efficient. In that case, policy can influence the terms of trade in order to achieve the optimal tradeoff between relative output gaps and relative inflation, as expressed in equation 
The Interest-Rate Reaction Functions
We can derive an interest rate rule that will support the optimal policies given by equations (79) and (80). (57)- (58) and (59)- (60), and using the definitions of CPI inflation given in equations (63) and (64) Similarly, under the optimal monetary policy, we can get a solution for "world" inflation:
Substituting equation (80) into equations
Under the assumption that the mark-up shocks follow AR(1) processes, we find:
Substituting these equations into the Euler equations for the Home and Foreign country,
given by equations (61) and (62), making use of the consumption equations (29) and (30), we find: Here, t rr represents the real interest rate in the efficient economy. We can use (88) and (89) to write: This finding starkly highlights the difference between monetary rules expressed as "target criteria" (or targeting rules) and monetary rules expressed as interest-rate reaction functions (or instrument rules.) The optimal interest-rate reaction functions presented in equations (90) and (91) appear to give no role for using monetary policy to respond to law of one price deviations. 20 See Appendix B for the complete solutions of the model under optimal policy.
However, the "target criteria" show the optimal tradeoff does give weight to the law of one price deviation. The key to understanding this apparent conflict is that the reaction functions, such as (90) and (91) are not only setting inflation rates. By setting Home relative to Foreign interest rates, they are also prescribing a relationship between Home and Foreign output gaps, the law of one price deviation, and Home relative to Foreign inflation rates.
If central bankers really did mechanically follow an interest rate rule, their optimal policy rules would have the nominal interest rate responding only to CPI inflation. In practice, however, central bankers set the interest rates to achieve their targets. We have shown that the optimal target criteria involves tradeoffs among the goals of achieving zero inflation, driving the output gaps to zero, and eliminating the law of one price gap.
The optimal policy indeed is not successful in eliminating the currency misalignment.
Nor does policy drive inflation to zero or eliminate the output gap. Monetary policymakers do not have sufficient control over the economy to achieve the efficient outcome. Appendix B.4
displays the solutions for inflation, the output gap, and the currency misalignment under optimal policy.
Optimal Policy under Commitment
Although CGG do not present the optimal targeting rules under commitment, the derivation of these under PCP and LCP is straightforward, and the relationship to the rules under discretion is analogous to that found in the closed economy literature.
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As in the closed economy, we find in the PCP model that the optimal tradeoff under commitment has the flavor of price-level targeting. When policymakers commit to a rule at time 0, the target criteria at all dates are given by: 
In comparison with the optimal rules under discretion, (68), policy under commitment trades off the output gap with the deviation of the current producer price and its level the period before the policy commitment was made,
Under LCP, the target criteria are altered in the same way. The tradeoff is between a real variable and a price level deviation under commitment, rather than between a real variable and inflation under discretion. The rules under commitment that are analogous to (79) and (80) 
No Mark-up Shocks
It is well known that in the PCP model, if there are no mark-up shocks and the optimal steady-state subsidies are in place, the efficient allocation is obtainable under optimal monetary policy. A policy that sets inflation of Home and Foreign prices to zero eliminates all distortions.
The flexibility of the exchange rate allows for optimal terms of trade response to shocks. This holds true both under commitment and under discretion.
Under LCP, interestingly, optimal policy sets Home and Foreign CPI inflation ( t π and * t π ) to zero in this case, but does not deliver the efficient outcome. It is easy to see that CPI inflation is zero in both countries under the optimal policies. Substitute the target criteria, (79) and (80), under discretion, into the Phillips curves, (77) and (78), assuming mark-up shocks are always zero ( .) The solutions to the expectational difference equations are , which imply . The same conclusion is reached applying the optimal policies under commitment, 93) and (94).
If CPI inflation rates are zero, it follows from the optimal rules that and 0
world output is at efficient levels, as is the real exchange rate. But this still does not imply that allocations are efficient. Using (76) and ( When there is pricing to market, the relative price of Foreign to Home goods in either market is not set efficiently. Even though policymakers can achieve an efficient level of world output when there are not mark-up shocks, they cannot ensure that the mix of Home and Foreign output is optimal. The price signals under LCP do not lead to efficient allocations.
Conclusions
Policymakers do not in general adhere to simple interest-rate reaction functions. Instead, as Svensson (1999 Svensson ( , 2002 has argued, they set targets for key economic variables. It has generally been believed, especially in light of CGG, that the key tradeoffs in an open economy are the same as in a closed economy. That is, policymakers should target a linear combination of inflation and the output gap. This paper shows that in fact, when our model is rich enough to allow for currency misalignments, the tradeoffs should involve not only inflation and the output gap but also the exchange rate misalignment. However, the interest-rate reaction functions rule that supports this policy has the nominal interest rate reacting only to CPI inflation.
The paper derives the policymaker's loss function when there is home bias in consumption and deviations from the law of one price. The loss function does depend on the structure of the model, of course, but not on the specific nature of price setting. Currency misalignments may arise in some approaches for reasons other than local-currency-pricing. For example, there may be nominal wage stickiness but imperfect pass-through that arises from strategic behavior by firms as in the models of Burstein (2007, 2008) or Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2007) . Future work can still make use of the loss function derived here, or at least of the steps used in deriving the loss function.
The objective of this paper is to introduce local-currency pricing into a familiar and popular framework for monetary policy analysis. But the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) Future work should also consider the difficult issue of policymaking in this environment when there is not cooperation. A separate but related issue is a closer examination of who bears the burden of currency misalignments. If a currency is overvalued, does it hurt consumers in one country more than another, both under optimal and sub-optimal policy?
While rich models that can be estimated and analyzed numerically offer valuable insights, they seem to provide inadequate guidance to policymakers for how to react to exchange rate movements. Perhaps more basic work on simple models such as the one presented here, in concert with quantitative exploration of more detailed models, can be productive.
where .
Under a globally efficient allocation, the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and aggregate consumption should equal the marginal product of labor times the price of output relative to consumption prices. To see the derivation more cleanly, we insert the shadow real wages in the efficient allocation, t H w p t − and * * t w p − F t into equations (A10) and (A11) below.
So, the efficient allocation would be achieved in a model with flexible wages and optimal subsidies. These equations then can be understood intuitively by looking at the wage setting equations below ((A14)-(A15), and (A16)-(A17)) assuming the optimal subsidy is in place. But, to emphasize, they do not depend on a particular model of wage setting, and are just the standard efficiency condition equating the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and aggregate consumption to the marginal rate of transformation.
(A10) 
Flexible Prices
We can solve for the values of all the real variables under flexible prices by using equations (A2), (A3), (A7), (A8), (A9), (A14) and (A15), as well as the price-setting conditions, from (43) 
Similarly for foreign producer-price inflation, we have: 
In addition, from (18) and (51), we derive: (A23)
Similarly, we can derive:
From (A7)-(A8) and (A14)-(A15), we see
initial condition, we conclude * t t s s = − as we noted above. That is, the relative price of Foreign to Home goods is the same in both countries. We emphasize that this is true in general for a firstorder approximation.
Appendix B B.I Derivation of Welfare Function in Clarida-Gali-Gertler model with Home Bias in preferences
The object is to rewrite the welfare function, which is defined in terms of home and foreign consumption and labor effort into terms of the squared output gap and squared inflation. We derive the joint welfare function of home and foreign households, since we will be examining cooperative monetary policy.
Most From equation (1) in the text, the period utility of the planner is given by:
Take a second-order log approximation around the non-stochastic steady state. We assume allocations are efficient in steady state, so we have We get:
Since we can equivalently maximize an affine transformation of (B2), it is convenient to simplify that equation to get: 
( ) their expression at the top of p. 903, multiply their utility by 2 (since they take average utility), and set their γ equal to ½ (so their country sizes are equal.
B.2 Derivation of Welfare Function under LCP with Home Bias in Preferences
The second-order approximation to welfare in terms of logs of consumption and employment of course does not change, so equation (B6) still holds. As before, we break down the derivation into two parts. We use first-order approximations to structural equations to derive an approximation to the quadratic term ( That is, we have: 
